Laughing about laughter: comparing conversational analysis, emotion psychology, and dialogical semantics by Ginzburg, Jonathan & Mazzocconi, Chiara
Laughter and Other Non-Verbal Vocalisations Workshop 2020
5 October 2020, Bielefeld, Germany
36
Laughing about laughter: comparing conversational analysis, emotion
psychology, and dialogical semantics
Jonathan Ginzburg
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That laughter invites laughter is a basic tenet
of Conversation Analysis analyses of laugh-
ter, whereas emotion psychology analyses de-
scribe various emotive and social effects laugh-
ter exhibits relative to various phonetic param-
eters. We provide data concerning laughter
responses to laughter which we argue show
neither approach can explicate and more gen-
erally suggest they cannot offer a general ac-
count of laughter and related non-verbal social
signals. We sketch how distinct kinds of laugh-
ter responses to laughter—along with a host of
other kinds of responses–can be systematically
analyzed within a dialogical semantics, which
integrates illocutionary and emotive effects.
1 Introduction
As Gail Jefferson has emphasized laughter often
gives rise to or invites laughter. In (Jefferson, 2004)
she discusses example like (1), viewing it as an
instance of her hypothesis that in ‘male’/‘female’
interaction (her scare quotes) the ‘female’ tends to
start laughing only once the ‘man’ does. (Kohler,
2008) reanalyzes this example suggesting Philip’s
laughter concerns his daughter’s short stay, whereas
Lesley’s laugh empathizes with Philip:
(1) (Jefferson, 2004, p. 120):
1 Philip: She’s having three weeks
’n staying here one week
2 I[think (is it) ]
3 Lesley: [ Y e: a ]
4 Lesley: [Yes
5 Philip: [eh-heh-he[h
6 Lesley: he-huh he-huh
7 Philip: Yes, ye[s.
8 Lesley: [S’pose she’ll be here
for Christmas, won’t she
9 Philip: Oh, yes, yes.
In (2) Bayern München goalie Manuel Neuer is
asked whether his team will reuse in their next
game the three-in-the-back defense that proved
problematic in the game just played (3-2 against
Paderborn), his brief, dismissive laugh implies they
will not, which amuses the gathered journalists:1
(2) Journalist: (smile: Dreierkette auch ‘ne
Option?)
Manuel Neuer: fuh fuh fuh (brief laugh)
Journalists: heh-he-he-he (laugh loudly)
The examples in (1,2) illustrate that laughter is
naturally followed by different kinds of laughter,
which is a consequence of laughter’s ambiguity:
two highly perceptive linguists disagree about the
function of the second laugh in (1), whereas in
(2) the first laugh communicates a negative an-
swer, while the second laugh communicates amuse-
ment. On the face of it, this is not news for re-
search on laughter or smiling, either for Conversa-
tion Analysis approaches (Jefferson, 2004; Glenn,
2003; Glenn and Holt, 2013) or for emotion-based
accounts coming from social psychology and neu-
roscience (Niedenthal et al., 2010; Wood et al.,
2017) since both types of approach recognize var-
ious things interlocutors can achieve using laugh-
ter/smiling (CA), or postulate multiple distinct
functions (Emotion Psychology).
Our claim, however, is that although each ap-
proach brings important ingredients to the explana-
1The report by Tim Brack in SZ is the following:
Ein Lachen kann sehr unterschiedliche Bedeutungen haben.
Es kann herzlich sein, aber auch höhnisch. Als Manuel
Neuer nach dem zittrigen 3:2-Sieg des FC Bayern gegen
Paderborn lachte, lautete die klare Botschaft: nein. Es
war sozusagen ein verneinendes Lachen. Der Torhüter
war gefragt worden, ob die Dreierkette, die sich gegen den
Tabellenletzten vor ihm aufgereiht hatte, auch eine Option
für das Champions-League-Spiel gegen den FC Chelsea
sei. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/sport/
bayern-paderborn-neuer-flick-1.4811661
We thank Tim Brack for providing us with the audio for this
example.
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tory table, neither supports an adequate explica-
tion of these examples and more generally cannot
support a general account of laughter and related
non-verbal social signals. We argue that a semantic-
pragmatic account that integrates laughter/smiling
(and other non-verbal social signals) with verbal
meaning enables a synthesis of such approaches.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2,
we discuss briefly CA and social psychology strate-
gies for analyzing laughter. In section 3 we discuss
the basic components for a semantic-pragmatic ap-
proach to laughter. We return to the initial examples
in section 4.
2 Responding to laughter: two
approaches
As (Glenn and Holt, 2013) explain CA associates
laughables as ‘referents’ for laughter but explicitly
assumes no semantics beyond this. ‘. . . Although
laughter lacks semantic or linguistic content, vari-
ations in its production contribute to its commu-
nicative value (Glenn and Holt, 2013, p. 6)); There
is recognition of a variety of effects laughter can
produce:
(3) a. (same turn) a tension between what we say,
how this could be interpreted by others and
what we mean
b. in terminal position can modulate a (poten-
tially or incipient) disaffiliative action
c. as a “post-completion stance marker”
d. adjust the seriousness of its referent
(Glenn and Holt, 2013, p. 6).
But in the absence of anything more than a ‘referen-
tial semantics’ in terms of laughables these remain
an essentially arbitrary list of effects. Moreover,
since CA avoids any explicit means of represent-
ing emotion, in saying that laughter can serve as a
stance marker, it has no way to distinguish laughter
like Lesley’s in (1) from verbal stance markers such
as ‘yea’ and ‘mmh’.
In contrast, on accounts of smiling and laughter
like (Niedenthal et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2017)
emotional effects are reified. However, as with CA,
the distinct functions postulated are not systemat-
ically related. Moreover, since the analysis is not
integrated with an account of linguistic context an
example such as (2), where an illocutionary effect
of communicating negation to a previous utterance
occurs, cannot be captured.
3 Laughter in dialogical semantics: a
sketch
We sketch an approach initiated in (Ginzburg et al.,
2015), further developed in (Ginzburg and Tian,
2018), where formal details can be found. The
approach
1. explains laughter ambiguity parsimoniously,
in terms of two distinct semantic meanings,
2. . . . but allows an unlimited range of laughter
episode types based on pragmatic reasoning,
3. captures emotional effects, so in particular
distinguishes laughter from verbal back chan-
nels/stance markers,
4. captures illocutionary effects, so accounts for
Neuer’s negation effect in (2).
3.1 Laughter Meanings
On the approach here, we postulate two basic mean-
ings for laughter:
(4) a. Pleasant(p, δ, spkr) given: a context that
supplies a laughable p and speaker spkr,
content: the laughable is pleasant for the
speaker to a contextually given degree δ.
b. Incongr(p,δ,τ ) given: a context that sup-
plies a laughable p and topos τ , content:
the proposition that p is incongruous rela-
tive to τ (to extent δ).
Here one of the relata of incongruity is a topos τ ,
an inference rule that represents “congruity” (what
is expected). We use the Aristotelian notions of
topos and enthymeme (Breitholtz, 2014), where
Topoi represent general inferential patterns (e.g.,
given two routes choose the shortest one). En-
thymemes are the actual arguments conveyed in
dialogue or other discourse which are drawing on
topoi. In other words, they are applications of topoi
in particular cases, e.g., given that the route via
Walnut street is shorter than the route via Alma,
choose Walnut street.
3.2 Cognitive States for laughing in dialogue
In order to capture emotional effects in parallel with
illocutionary ones, we integrate Scherer’s compo-
nent process model(CPM) of appraisal (Scherer,
2009) with the cognitive states in the style of the di-
alogical framework KoS (Ginzburg et al., 2015).
This means that dialogue cognitive states track
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various aspects of the emerging context, includ-
ing turn ownership, shared assumptions (FACTS),
questions under discussion (QUD), the visual field,
moves that are in the process of being or have
been grounded (Pending, Moves) and MOOD—a
weighted sum of appraisals. Here MOOD repre-
sents the publicly accessible emotional aspect of an
agent that arises by publicly visible actions (such
as non-verbal social signals), which can but need
not diverge from the private emotional state. Such
cognitive states can represent both illocutionary up-
dates, as in (5a-d) and emotion-based updates, such
as (5d):
(5) a. Ask/Assert QUD-incrementation: given a
question q and ASK(A,B,q)/Assert(A,B,p)
being the LatestMove, one can update
QUD with q/p? as MaxQUD.
b. QSPEC: this rule characterizes the contex-
tual background of reactive queries and
assertions—if q is MaxQUD, then subse-
quent to this either conversational partici-
pant may make a move constrained to be
q-specific (i.e., either a direct answer or a
sub–question of q).
c. Accept move: specifies that the back-
ground for an acceptance move by B is
an assertion by A and the effect is to mod-
ifyFACTS with p.
d. Clarification question: if A’s utterance u is
in Pending, QUD can be updated with the
question What did A mean by u.
e. Positive affect incrementation of Mood:
given the LatestMove being an incon-
gruity proposition by the speaker, the
speaker increments the (positive) pleasant-
ness recorded in Mood to an extent deter-
mined by the laughter’s arousal value.
3.3 Laughter Reasoning
We sketch some examples of functions that emerge
from the basic laughter meanings via pragmatic
reasoning:
1. Affiliation: Affiliative laughter arises as an
inference from Pleasant laughter by resolving
the laughable as the state where the speaker
and addressee are co-present.
2. Empathetic acknowledgement: Empathetic
acknowledgement of A’s utterance by B laugh-
ing arises as inference from Pleasant laughter,
assuming the topos If it’s pleasant for me that
you said that p, then I agree that p—A’s utter-
ance is the event pleasant for B.
3. Superiority laughter: In similar fashion, we
can explicate the source of “mocking” and/or
“superiority” laughter: A observes an event
e which affects B negatively. Laughter can
then be taken to reflect A’s appraisal of e as
pleasant.
4. Irony: Whenever a declarative utterance is
made by A which involves a proposition p
there are (inter alia) two possible understand-
ings available (consequents of conversational
topoi): with high probability: A asserts p,
or with low probability: A intends to convey
a content incompatible with p. Incongruity
here involves a clash with the high probability
topos.
5. Question deflection: laughter as deflecting a
question can be analyzed as signalling a clash
with standard conversational rule following a
question. The conflicting topos in this case
is the conversational rule if A poses q, then
either A or B utter a utterance conveying a
direct answer..
3.4 Coherent Responses to Laughter
In light of this, a variety of responses to laughter
are possible:
1. Laughter responses: A’s incongruous laugh
about laughable p conveys the assertion that
p is incongruous. B can accept this move—
affirming p’s incongruity, by laughter or ver-
bally, or both.
2. Disagreement: An incongruous laugh by A
raises the issue of whether p is indeed incon-
gruous. The issue can be discussed, without
laughter by B, as exemplified by Jefferson’s
(6):
(6) Bee: So the next class hhh!hh fer an
hour and fifteen minutes I watched
his ha:nds hh hh hhh
Ava: What’s the matter with him?
Bee: hh t hhh he keh he doesn’t haff
uh full use uff hiss hha fingers
(Jefferson, 1979, example (12))
Laughter and Other Non-Verbal Vocalisations Workshop 2020
5 October 2020, Bielefeld, Germany
39
3. Clarification question responses: since in-
congruous laughter involves resolving the
source of incongruity (laughable p and topos
τ ), a laugh can give rise to clarification ques-
tions, as discussed by (Mazzocconi, 2019).
4. Frown responses: (Ginzburg and Tian, 2018)
propose to analyze frowns in terms of the
following contents—NegRaise(p, q, δ, spkr):
the frownable p gives rise to a question q; this
also yields a Mood update in which pleasant-
ness affect is decreased. Hence, if B cannot
share A’s incongruity–conveying laugh (e.g.,
B is still wondering whether there really is an
incongruity) gives rise to B’s frown.
4 Revisiting the data
With respect to (1), we can (in principle) vali-
date both Jefferson’s analysis and Kohler’s: we
can analyze Lesley’s laugh as sharing Philip’s as-
sessment of his daughter’s behaviour as incongru-
ous. In such a case both laughs have as content
Incongruous(p, τ, δ), here τ could be posited as
a topos to the effect that ‘Children should maxi-
mize their vacation stays with their parents’. On
Kohler’s analysis Lesley’s laugh expresses affilia-
tion with Philip’s utterance or laugh, via a pleasant
laugh, as explained above.
With respect to (2), we view Neuer’s response
as an instance of question or rather suggestion
deflection—communicating that the suggestion
does not deserve consideration. Here the laughable
is the journalist’s utterance. A further inference
from this is that since the suggestion put forward to
possibly use the Dreierkette need not be considered,
the Dreierkette will not be used. The journalists’
laugh in this case is most plausibly analyzed also
as incongruous, where the laughable is Neuer’s
response.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
That laughter invites laughter is a basic tenet of
CA analyses of laughter, while describing but not
explicating the distinct functions laughter can have.
That laughter achieves various emotive effects (or
has distinct functions) relative to various phonetic
parameters is what social psychlogical analyses
deliver,2 though in a way that does not integrate no-
tions of conversational context crucial for explain-
2Though see (Mazzocconi, 2019) for evidence that a
straightforward acoustic form-function mapping is not viable.
ing its use in conversation. We have sketched how
distinct kinds of laughter responses to laughter—
along with a host of other kinds of responses–can
be systematically analyzed within a dialogical se-
mantics, which integrates illocutionary and emotive
effects.
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